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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Each year, approximately 795,000 people in the United States will have a stroke
(American Heart Association, 2010). Many stroke survivors who resume driving have
residual physical, cognitive, and perceptual deficits that may impair the knowledge and
skill necessary to drive safely, and an estimated 30 to 75% resume driving after their
stroke (Mazer, Gelinas, & Benoit, 2004). Although the requisite skills for driving a motor
vehicle are not completely known, it is evident that driving requires high-level cognitive,
perceptual, and motor functioning.

Although many stroke survivors have residual

impairments in these domains (Gillen, 1998), disabilities are not, of themselves, related
to increased risk of adverse driving incidents (Haskelhorn et al., 1998; Hopewell, 2002;
van Zomeren et al., 1987). Compensatory skills and psychological factors such as
motivation and awareness of deficit substantially influence fitness to drive (Hopewell et
al., 1990; Ryan et al., 2009; Kumar, 1991; Lundqvist et al., 2000). Traditional evaluation
methods such as neuropsychological and on-road testing, as well as modern
technologies such as driving simulators, can substantially improve prediction of fitness
to drive (Akinwuntan et al., 2002; Klavora et al., 2000; Korner-Bitensky et al., 2000;
Lundberg et al., 2003; Lundqvist et al., 2000; Mazer et al., 1998; Nouri, 1987, 1993);
however, evidence suggests that survivors and their significant others frequently do not
make their decisions about resumption of driving based on such evidence. Research on
populations with disabilities other than stroke indicates that the relation between
objective indices of fitness to drive and perceptions of fitness to drive are generally
much poorer than would be desired for valid decision-making (Coleman et al., 2002;
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Kelly, 1999). Thus, survivors and their significant others may be making this important
determination based on inaccurate information.

It may be possible to evaluate

survivors’ and significant others’ awareness and accuracy of survivor’s driving ability
through an objective index of driving fitness, the driving simulator.
Stroke Sequelae and Fitness to Drive
Stroke survivors may face any number of neuropsychological, cognitive, and
physical impairments as the result of infarct and damage to the connecting brain
structures (Coleman Bryer, Rapport, & Hanks, 2005; Gillen, 1998). Many of the
impairments stroke survivors may incur involve those skills necessary for safe driving
(e.g., sensory and motor functioning, visuospatial abilities, processing speed, attention,
memory, and problem solving; Bryer et al., 2004; Innes et al., 2007). Stroke survivors
have been shown to perform significantly worse than healthy controls (matched for age,
gender, education, and driving experience) on tasks measuring a wide variety of
domains, including simple reaction time, processing speed, attention, short-term and
long-term memory, language, and general cognitive processing (Lundqvist, Gerdle, &
Ronnberg, 2000; Sundet et al.,1995). However, research on the relative influences of
impairments in these domains in discriminating between drivers and non-drivers post
stroke has produced mixed results (see Akinwuntan et al., 2002; Klavora et al., 2000;
Mazer et al., 1998; Nouri et al., 1987). Similarly, deficits in basic sensory-perceptual
functions do not necessarily compromise driving ability (Fisk, Owsley, & Mennemeier,
2002).
Some studies indicate that survivors of right-hemisphere strokes are at greater
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risk for automobile accident than are survivors of left-hemisphere strokes (see Bryer,
Rapport & Hanks, 2004 for review). For example, Chaudhuri (1987) found that 60% of
right hemiparetic patients and 40% of left hemiparetic patients were able to drive
successfully post-stroke. These findings make sense given that deficits in visuospatial
ability and attention are more common following right-hemisphere stroke (Heilman et al.,
2003). In contrast, several studies found no relationship between laterality of stroke and
driving outcomes (Akinwuntan et al., 2002; Chaudhuri, 1987; Cushman et al., 1999;
Jones, 1983; Lings et al., 1991; Mazer et al., 2003; Sundet et al., 1995). Some research
indicates that deficits associated with left-hemisphere stroke (Fisk et al., 2002) such as
aphasia (Golper, Rau, & Marshall, 1980; MacKenzie et al., 2003) are sufficient to
compromise fitness to drive substantially. For example, Mackenzie and Paton (2003)
suggest that aphasic stroke survivors should not automatically be precluded from
driving but that an inability to recognize road signs and difficulty with reading
comprehension might be counter-indicative to driving. One problem in evaluating the
literature regarding laterality of stroke and fitness to drive is that many studies exclude
persons with aphasia. Also, survivors of left-hemisphere stroke may be referred for
driving evaluations less often than survivors of right-hemisphere stroke, whose typical
deficits are more obviously related to driving fitness.
Visuospatial neglect (i.e., hemi-inattention), a deficit common among survivors
who sustain right-hemisphere stroke, has been found to be a significant predictor of
whether survivors were approved to drive post-stroke (Sundet, Goffeng, & Hofft, 1995).
While in driving simulators, stroke survivors with neglect displayed less eye and head
movement than did similarly aged controls with normal vision; in contrast, stroke
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survivors with hemianopia (visual field cut) but without neglect displayed more head
movement than the normal controls (Szlyk, Brigell, & Seiple, 1993). This finding may
indicate that survivors with sensory-only vision problems can adjust for their limitations;
however, the sample for this study consisted of only 6 stroke survivors, only 3 of whom
had neglect and simulator time was limited to 5 minutes.
Several authors have suggested that risk for accidents is moderated by higherorder cognitive abilities such as executive functioning (Coleman et al., 2002; Daigneault
et al., 2002; Hopewell, 2002; Mazer et al., 1998; Rapport et al., 1993; Schanke et al.,
2000). In addition to regulating skills essential to driving such as complex attention and
multi-tasking, self-regulatory aspects of executive control affect the functional capacity
of other cognitive and motor functions. For example, the functional range of peripheral
vision is inversely related to cognitive load; thus, peripheral vision can be intact but
hindered by the complexity of the cognitive challenge (Fisk et al., 2002). The component
of executive functioning associated with self-awareness of deficit appears particularly
important to driving fitness (Bogod, Mateer, & MacDonald, 2003; Burgess, Alderman,
Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998; Ryan et al., 2009). Yet, many stroke survivors resume
driving despite increased risk associated with impairments for which they cannot
compensate safely. Knowledge of accident risk alone may not be sufficient to alter
behavior patterns (McKenna & Horswill, 2006). It is not clear whether these survivors
inaccurately believe that they are fit to drive (Heikkilä, 1999) or drive despite knowledge
that they are at high risk (Lings, 1991). The accuracy of perceptions regarding fitness to
drive has a direct relationship to the validity of decisions regarding driving behavior.
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Self-awareness of deficit
Clearly, a stroke survivor’s awareness of residual deficits can be an important
factor in whether they are fit to drive. Persons who are aware of their deficits are less
likely to engage in high-risk behavior that exceeds their abilities than are persons who
do not fully appreciate their deficits, and underappreciation of even mild deficits can
substantially increase risk if the person chooses to drive (Rapport et al., 1993). Selfmonitoring functions of executive control are essential to driving risk, because
awareness of deficit moderates the recognition of need to invoke appropriate
compensatory strategies (Rapport et al., 1993, 1998a, 1998b).
Unawareness of deficit is commonly observed following stroke. Traditional
literature on anosognosia, the unawareness of illness or deficits, purports that it is more
commonly observed following right-hemisphere insult than left-hemisphere insult
(Heilman et al., 2003; Jehkonen, Laihosalo, & Kettunen, 2006; Karnath, Baier, &
Nägele, 2005, Spalletta, Ripa, Bria, Caltagirone, & Robinson, 2006). Lesion mapping in
27 stroke survivors (Karnath, Baier, & Nägele, 2005) indicated that anosognosia for
hemiplegia/hemiparesis was significantly associated with right posterior insula lesions
as compared to individuals with hemiplegia/hemiparesis but awareness of their deficits.
Jehkonen, Ahonen, Dastidar, Laippala, and Vilkka (2000) found that among patients
with acute right hemisphere infarction, there was a double dissociation of anosognosia
for neglect and hemiparesis, as well as anosognosia for neglect and unawareness of
illness. This finding is consistent with the general literature in a variety of neurological
disorders indicating that unawareness can be domain specific rather than a global
phenomenon (Hart, Sherer, Whyte, Polansky, & Novack, 2004; Sherman et al., 2007).
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Among stroke survivors, awareness is multidimensional and may differ across domains
(see Orfei et al., 2007 for detailed review; Vallar & Ronchi, 2006; Vuilleumier, 2004).
Fischer, Trexler, and Gauggel (2004) used a mixed neurological sample of
traumatic brain injury (TBI), stroke survivors, and orthopedic controls to examine
possible domain differences, as well as awareness of activity limitations, using the
Patient Competency Rating Scale (Prigatano & Fordyce, 1986). Participants predicted
how they would perform on a test of motor ability (finger tapping) and cognition (list
learning). Neither group over-predicted performance on simple motor tasks in any of the
groups; however, the TBI/stroke group overestimated on the cognitive task with the TBI
participants showing greater overprediction than stroke participants. When comparing
staff and participant ratings in activity limitations, the control group with orthopedic injury
underestimated and the TBI/stroke group overestimated their level of functioning on the
total score and on the social/emotional subscale. Participant and staff estimates were
in agreement on the physical/self-care subscale.
Similarly, in a study of 87 stroke survivors, comparison between self-ratings of
cognitive abilities and the ratings of hospital staff members on the same measures,
revealed little agreement (Gauggel, Peleska, & Bode, 2000). There were moderately
high correlations between cognitive test scores and ratings made by staff, but much
lower correlations between the tests and self-ratings provided by survivors. Conversely,
when comparing patient and significant other reports of ability, these authors found that
the largest discrepancy in ratings occurred in the evaluation of motor activities. On
cognitive and emotional aspects, patients actually rated themselves as more impaired
than significant others did (Gauggel, Peleska, & Bode, 2000). A possible explanation
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for this deviant finding is that patients’ cognitive deficits were the focus of therapy or
conversation with significant others due to safety concerns and therefore were more
salient during questioning. Similarly, the discrepancy between patient and significant
other ratings on motoric ability may be due to lack of awareness by the patient or the
significant others’ safety concerns and desire to monitor patient activity level. Previous
work (Coleman et al., 2002; Rapport et al., 2006; Scott et al., 2009) has demonstrated
that significant others frequently control patients’ mobility by “holding the keys” when
determining if stroke survivors can resume driving.
These studies indicate that stroke survivors may have differential awareness of
their deficits and strengths across domains (Orfei et al., 2007). Theories offered to
explain impaired awareness of deficit help clarify differential awareness of deficits.
General theories (Flashman & Strong, 1995; Flashman, Amador, & McAllister,
1998; Allen & Ruff, 1990) of self-awareness distinguish between psychological and
neuropsychological/cognitive factors and levels of awareness. Deficits threatening to
the individual may not be fully processed and therefore awareness is limited.
Vuilleumier (2004) suggested that patients must complete three steps (ABC:
Appreciate, Belief, Check) to have full awareness of their deficits. Defects in “ABC”
functioning could differentially apply to domains of functioning, explaining dissociations
in awareness. General theories of awareness also suggest that there is an executive or
supervising control function directing subordinate cognitive skills. Research has found
that executive functioning deficits in set-shifting and flexibility are more frequent in
patients with impaired self-awareness (Starkstein, Fedoroff, Price, Leiguarda, et al.,
1993). Memory impairment (Marcell et al., 2004), specifically the failure to integrate new
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information regarding deficits and impairments in attention (Starkstein et al., 1992) has
also been postulated to explain lack of awareness. Damage to subcortical circuits, as a
result of the stroke, may affect a survivor’s ability to self-monitor and adjust based on
novel experience (Vuilleumier, 2000).
Cognitive estimation and awareness of deficit.
Cognitive abilities required to estimate the extent of deficits are related to awareness
of deficit. Impairments in cognitive estimation abilities in a variety of domains have been
observed among persons with lesions to the frontal lobes (Shallice & Evans, 1978;
Smith & Milner, 1984; Della Sala et al., 2004), as well as neurological disorders such as
Alzheimer's disease (Brand et al., 2003; Della Sala et al., 2004), alcoholic Korsakoff’s
disease (Brand et al., 2003; Della Sala et al., 2004; Shoqeirat et al., 1988; Taylor &
O'Carroll, 1995), and post-encephalic amnesia (Leng & Parkin, 1988; Shoqeirat et al.,
1988). Prior research has demonstrated some relation between cognitive estimation
and education (Della Sala, MacPherson, Phillips, Sacco, & Spinnler, 2003) and general
intelligence (Brand et al., 2003), although studies have found the associations to
general intelligence, as well as depression and state anxiety, very small in comparison
to semantic memory (Freeman, Ryan, Lopez, & Mittenberg, 1995). At least one study
has reported an effect of gender among healthy adults, with women performing more
poorly than men; however, age was not associated with performance (Della Sala et al.,
2003).
Many theories proffer that cognitive estimation is primarily related to executive
functioning (e.g., Silverman, Hanks, & McKay, 2007; Shallice & Evans, 1978), although
some research has not supported this association (Appollonio et al., 2003; Spencer &
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Johnson-Greene, 2008; Taylor & O'Carroll, 1995). Recent theories posit an additional
role of semantic memory systems as important to cognitive estimation, given the
importance of both executive and semantic systems to problem-solving and “plausibility
checks” (Brand et al., 2003; Della Sala et al., 2004; Freeman, Ryan, Lopez, &
Mittenberg, 1995). Deficits in both of these domains are commonly observed following
stroke.
The observation of deficits in cognitive estimation following stroke has a direct
bearing on risk and fitness to drive: Awareness of deficit is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to reduce risk, because persons who acknowledge having deficits must also
accurately assess their severity in order to invoke compensatory behaviors that are
proportionate to the need. Additionally, preliminary research on self-assessment of
driving ability among 67 stroke survivors (Scott et al., 2009) suggests that fundamental
abilities in cognitive estimation pervade self-estimates: The tendency to over- or underestimate external stimuli on a cognitive estimation task was significantly associated with
self-estimates of driving ability (rho = .48).
Therefore, stroke survivors may face the inability to accurately assess driving
ability as well as any number of deficits that disrupt the actual ability to drive safely.
Thus, objective measures of fitness to drive are important.
Predicting fitness to drive after stroke.
A well-accepted and standardized method of assessing whether a stroke survivor
can and should resume driving has not been established. The deficits that stroke
survivors typically experience are easier to elucidate than are the specific skills
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necessary for safe driving. However, a variety of methods have been developed to help
predict driving ability. These include neuropsychological evaluations, on-road
evaluations, use of driving simulators, and clinical judgments by health professionals
that are made both with and without information from these resources.
On-road testing is considered a criterion standard in driving evaluations
(Akinwuntan et al., 2005, Jones, Gidden, and Croft, 1983; Korner-Bitensky et al., 1998;
Soderstrom, Pettersson, & Leppert, 2006) but it is expensive and may pose
unnecessary safety risks. Additionally, on-road testing may not illuminate subtle
psychological and motor impairments that affect fundamental driving skills (Klavora,
Heslegrove, & Young, 2000). Further, hazardous situations are difficult to replicate
during on-road testing, leaving therapists without evidence of how survivors might
handle these scenarios.
In general, research indicates that neuropsychological assessment is useful in
predicting fitness to drive following stroke (Akinwuntan, Feys, DeWeerdt, Pauwels,
Baten, & Strypstein, 2002; Klavora, Heslegrave, & Young, 2000; Korner-Bitensky,
Mazer, Sofer, Gelinas, Meyer, Morrison, 2000; Lundberg, Caneman, Samuelsson,
Hakamies-Blomqvist, & Almkvist, 2003; Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg, 2000; Mazer,
Korner-Bitensky, & Sofer, 1998; Nouri et al., 1993; Nouri, Tinson, & Lincoln, 1987). In a
brain injury population, the overall accuracy rate of a cognitive battery in predicting a
failing score on the road was 92% and it was 71% in predicting a passing score
(McKenna, Jefferies, Dobson, & Frude, 2004). Although a significant relationship
between neuropsychological functioning and driving ability (as measured by on-road
and off-road testing) has been found in a meta-analysis of driving studies with a
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dementia population (Reger, Welsh, Watson, Cholerton, Baker, & Craft, 2004), the
same work suggested that neuropsychological tests should not be used as the only
decision criterion, and this opinion has been supported by most experts in evaluation of
driving fitness (see Bryer et al., 2005). The use of neuropsychological measures that
tap multiple cognitive domains relevant to driving seem to best predict driving ability
(Marshall et al., 2007). Executive functioning, processing speed, and visuospatial
processing are among the domains typically tested in examining fitness to drive.
Despite

this

recommendation,

recent

work

has

shown

that

a

very

brief

neuropsychological screen (measures of visual neglect and Rey Complex Figure), in
addition to on-road testing, showed good prediction of fitness to drive after stroke as
defined by medical team decision (Akinwuntan et al., 2006).
Driving simulators are also available to test driving fitness (Klavora et al., 2000).
The use of driving simulators and virtual reality may provide a more realistic and costeffective driving and testing experience without the obvious safety risks of on-road
testing (Schultheis & Mourant, 2001). Additionally, the use of driving simulators allows
the evaluation of driving ability over a period of time (Mazer et al., 2004) and may allow
for the best balance of safely assessing driving ability while attempting to test reaction
to difficult situations (Bieliauskas, 2005).
Although there is little research examining the validity of driving simulators
among stroke populations, the clinical utility of driving simulators has improved (Lew et
al., 2005). One study to examine the efficacy of driving simulators and fitness to drive in
a stroke population was conducted by Nouri and Tinson (1988). The authors compared
performance on a driving simulator with on-road examinations in 38 stroke survivors.
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Results of the study must be interpreted with caution because the simulator that they
used considered green light acceleration and braking reaction time only; however, the
simulator was helpful in predicting fitness to drive in the majority of survivors.
Research examining the relation between driving simulator performance and onroad performance has produced mixed results (Monga, 1997; Owsley, 1998; Keller,
Kesserling, & Hiltbrunner, 2003; Galski et al., 1992; and Lundqvist et al., 2000). One of
the most favorable studies for the driving simulator (Lundqvist et al., 2000) indicates that
the driving simulator is capable of correctly classifying the overall driving skill of 85% of
stroke survivors.
Despite the availability of objective indices of driving safety, they are not
frequently pursued. Stroke survivors are often released from the hospital with no advice
from their physicians regarding driving (Goodyear & Roseveare, 2003; Fisk, Owsley, &
Mennemeier, 2002; Fisk, Owsley, & Pulley, 1997; Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg,
2000). Fisk et al. (2002) reported that 33% of stroke survivors received advice about
driving from physicians and 27% received advice from family members. Therefore, it is
important to determine how individuals make the decision to resume driving.
Self-assessment of driving ability
Many stroke survivors appear to self-regulate their driving behavior (Fisk,
Owsley, Pulley, 2002). Evidence of this fact may be observed in the low rate of return
to driving among stroke survivors (Fisk, Owsley, Pulley, 1997; Legh-Smith et al. 1986;
Fisk, Owsley and Mennemeir, 2002), as well as a reduced number of days and miles
driven per week (Fisk et al., 2002; Mackenzie & Paton, 2003), an avoidance of
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challenging environments such as night driving, heavy traffic, and inclement weather
(Fisk et al., 2002), and an increase in compensatory behaviors (Mackenzie & Paton,
2003). It is important to consider that many of these studies relied exclusively upon selfreport, which requires survivors to be aware of and accurately estimate both the deficits
they may possess and the verity of compensatory behaviors they actually carry out.
Additionally, reductions and limitations of this nature may reflect the influences of
external forces, such as the decisions of significant others or health care professionals.
In fact, prior research on populations with disabilities other than stroke (e.g., TBI)
suggests that significant others frequently maintain the greatest influence on whether
and how much survivors drive (Coleman et al., 2002; Rapport et al., 2006).
Decision to drive after stroke
The decision regarding whether to resume driving after stroke is a complex
endeavor. Support from family is essential to successful rehabilitation, including return
to driving (Schanke et al., 2000). Advice from family or health care professionals can
have a substantial influence on this decision-making process (Coleman et al., 2002;
Fisk et al., 1997; Schanke et al., 2000).
Unfortunately, survivors and family members rarely have sufficient knowledge to
form opinions on an empirical basis. For example, the relation between survivors’
perceptions of their restrictions and actual medical contraindications to driving is weak
(Kelly et al, 1999). Additionally, among persons with TBI, significant others appear to
have the most influence regarding whether the survivor will resume driving and how
much they will drive (Coleman et al., 2002; Rapport et al., 2006); however, the relation
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between the survivor’s actual fitness to drive and the significant other’s perceptions of
that ability appears only modest at best (Coleman et al., 2002). This issue raises an
important concern, because significant others may be limiting the stroke survivor’s
driving unnecessarily or encouraging resumption of driving among survivors who are
unsafe to drive.
Scott et al., (2009) examined the opinions of stroke survivors and their significant
others regarding domains considered important in deciding whether survivors should
resume driving. Consistent with prior research on persons with TBI (Coleman et al.,
2002; Rapport et al., 2006), ratings by significant others were, in general, more strongly
related to survivors’ actual driving status than were ratings made by the survivors
themselves. Although 55% of significant others reported that professional advice was an
important consideration, the extent to which they received and used this information in
their decision-making process was not clear. In fact, professional advice was not among
the chief domains most strongly associated with survivors’ actual driving status (eta =
.23), which included sensory (eta = .55), physical (eta = .34), and cognitive (eta = .29)
functioning, as well as finances (eta = .23), emotional functioning (eta = .14) and
judgment (eta = .13). Equally important, survivors did not consider professional opinion
nearly as important to their decision-making process as the other domains (?): Only
convenience/ease (71.6%) was rated “quite a bit” or more important a consideration by
more than 50% of stroke survivors; no other domain was rated even “somewhat” or
more important by more than 50% of the survivors. This previous description of test
results seems a little bit difficult to follow.
Driving is an important aspect of community integration and sense of adult self.
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Among individuals with disabilities, driving cessation can adversely affect social
participation, occupation, and social mobility, as well as feelings of connectedness and
freedom from social limitations (Anderson et al., 2002; Kiyono et al., 2001; Kreutzer et
al., 2003; Siosteen, Lundqvist, Blomstrand, Sullivan, & Sullivan, 1990). Other studies
have linked cessation of driving to feelings of loneliness (Johnson, 1999), anger, and
frustration related to limitations on vocational and recreational activities (Hallett, Zasler,
Maurer, & Cash, 1994); adverse changes in personal roles (Hallett et al., 1994); and
feelings of diminished autonomy and mobility (Johnson, 1999; Lister, 1999). Alternative
transportation, when available, is often not an acceptable solution because of
inconvenience, unreliability, and lack of spontaneity (Brown et al., 2004, Coleman Bryer,
Rapport, Hanks, 2004; Rapport, Coleman Bryer, Hanks, 2008). Additionally, the same
physical or cognitive limitations that restrict driving may make public transportation
difficult (Rapport, Coleman Bryer, Hanks, 2008).

Given these challenges, the

importance of independent transportation is clear.
Some stroke survivors resume driving despite increased risk associated with
impairments for which they cannot compensate safely, whereas other survivors who
could resume driving safely do not do so. Accurate self-assessment of driving skill is
essential to making valid decisions regarding whether to resume driving; yet, stroke
survivors are particularly susceptible to unawareness of deficit. Moreover, although
survivors’ significant others appear to have a great deal of influence on survivors’
driving outcome, no research has established the validity of their perceptions of the
survivor.
A factor inherent in judgments of the survivor made by both survivors and their
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significant others is the well established finding that most individuals tend to
overestimate their own driving ability.
Ratings of driving ability
A large body of literature indicates that most individuals tend to overestimate the
safety and skill of their own driving (Finn & Bragg, 1986; Gregersen, 1996; Groeger &
Brown, 1989; Mathews & Moran, 1986; McKenna, Stanier & Lewis, 1991; Svenson,
1981). Svenson (1981) found that 88% of US drivers and 77% of Swedish drivers
considered themselves safer than the average driver.

Furthermore, 93% of US

respondents and 69% of Swedish respondents felt they were more skillful than the
average driver. Although this seminal study has been faulted for numerous design
flaws (Groeger & Brown, 1989; Groeger & Grande, 1996), subsequent studies using a
variety of improved designs have confirmed the fundamental finding that adults typically
rate themselves as above-average drivers (see Groeger & Grande, 1996 for review). In
one study, participants rated themselves as less likely to get in a traffic accident and as
having more driving skill and driving judgment than their peers (Glendon, Dorn, Davies,
Matthews, & Taylor, 1996). It is important to note that most studies of driving selfassessments have focused on adults (e.g., college students) much younger than the
average stroke survivor. However, Marottoli and Richardson (1998) reported that the
majority of their sample of adults age 77 years and older also rated themselves as
above-average drivers. Scott et al. (2007) found that 47% of stroke survivors rated
themselves as better-than-average or excellent drivers. In fact, 54% of survivors who
were currently driving and nearly 40% of survivors who had ceased driving rated
themselves as currently better-than-average or excellent drivers.
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Interestingly, Marottoli and Richardson (1998) found no relationship between a
history of adverse driving events and self-assessment of driving ability. Twenty-seven
percent of their sample rated their ability as better than their peers’, even when
independent judges rated them as having moderate to major problems on the road or
when they had a history of adverse events on the road. In fact, even feedback in the
form of an on-road driving test and criticism by professional driving evaluators did not
appear to alter fundamental self-ratings of driving ability (Groeger & Grande, 1996):
Drivers’ self-assessments of their general ability provided months prior to such an
experience best predicted self-assessments of their ability after a road test. In the
presence of explicit criticism during driving, self-ratings of the on-road performance itself
were related to objective indices of the performance (e.g., number of errors during the
task); however, self-ratings of general driving ability were unrelated to assessments of
them provided by the driving instructor. Moreover, in the absence of performance
feedback (i.e., criticism from the evaluator), drivers' self-ratings were unrelated even to
their performance on the immediate on-road task (Groeger & Grande, 1996). This
finding may provide insight into effective strategies for psychoeducation and drivers
training of stroke survivors who have impaired self-awareness.
This rating of self as superior to the average driver appears to be a stable trait
characteristic, rather than a state characteristic that responds and shifts in accordance
with recent data about driving ability. Groeger and Grande (1996) discuss the “driving
self” in the context of Markus and Nurius’ (1986) theory of the self, as an enduring selfview that becomes increasingly entrenched and resistant to change over time and with
experience. These authors suggest that in the absence of some extreme event (e.g., a
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severe accident), external feedback is ineffectual, and the driving self is unlikely to be
accurate or amenable to long-term change. In general, drivers’ self-ratings are far less
variable than are the ratings they assign others (e.g., novice drivers or “average”
drivers; Groeger & Grande, 1996). Feedback about driving performance tends to lower
how an individual rates an imaginary other driver and generally affects ratings of
nondescript drivers much more than self-ratings. Drivers’ self-views of their ability are
stable over time, and these self-assessments are very weakly related to objective
indices of their skill.
Two theories have been proposed as explanations for drivers’ over-confidence in
their own abilities.

Like its well-known predecessor, Festinger’s social comparison

theory (1954), Wills’ downward comparison theory suggests that individuals seek out
those worse than themselves as sources of comparison.

As a result, their self-

perception becomes distorted (see Wills, 1981 for review).

McKenna et al. (1991)

proposed a different explanation, the self-enhancement bias. They believed that an
individual’s perceptions are distorted so that they view themselves as superior to others
around them.

Thus, the self-enhancement bias is a positive-self bias whereas the

downward comparison theory is a negative-other bias (McKenna et al. 1991). Some
research seems to support Wills’ (1981) downward comparison theory (Walton &
Bathurst, 1998; Groeger & Grande, 1996), arguing that methodological flaws in
McKenna et al.’s work, such as asking participants to rate themselves compared to the
“average” driver, may have falsely supported the McKenna et al. (1991) theory of selfenhancement bias.
Prior work by Scott et al. (2009) supports the self-enhancement bias as
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individuals overestimate their driving ability, both when comparing themselves to the
average driver and when comparing themselves to a known comparison target.
However, comparison to a known target reduces positive self-bias regarding driving
ability. This phenomenon of shift in self-view as a function of the compared-to criterion
showed a disproportionate effect on stroke survivors, who became more accurate about
their current driving abilities when comparing themselves to a companion whose driving
skills were well known to them. Thus, comparison to a known target appeared to
enhance awareness of deficit among stroke survivors.

Scott et al. (2009) also

suggested that positive self-bias is a trait that may reflect a pervasive characteristic of
cognitive ability, as the tendency to overestimate driving ability was paralleled on a
cognitive estimation task. The study by Scott and colleagues highlighted that stroke
survivors may be doubly hindered in their assessment of their driving ability because of
the normal adult self-bias and cognitive impairments that undermine their ability to
estimate themselves accurately.
Summary and purpose
Resumption of driving post-stroke is important to community integration and
functional independence, and it helps prevent feelings of isolation and depression.
Stroke survivors are frequently left with deficits that hinder them from driving safely.
Unfortunately, many stroke survivors are uninformed about the barriers they may face in
safe driving. Fewer still are formally evaluated to determine whether a return to driving
would be safe.

Previous work (Scott et al., 2009) indicated that stroke survivors

overestimate their driving ability, particularly when using an ambiguous comparison
target, suggesting that the driving self is highly resistant to change, although it may be
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temporarily malleable.
Most healthy adults overestimate their driving ability, even in the presence of
immediate feedback to the contrary. This phenomenon likely reflects the high personal
valence of independent driving combined with entrenchment of self-view observed for
many trait characteristics. However, even among healthy drivers, actual skills, and the
accuracy of estimations of those skills, may vary considerably. Accurate estimations rely
on fundamental skills in cognitive estimation, self-monitoring, and awareness of deficit:
In judgments of driving ability, individuals must accurately assess the skills required by
the task (cognitive estimation), compare their own abilities and performances to those
demands (self-monitoring), and acknowledge discrepancies therein proportionately
(awareness of deficit + cognitive estimation). Impairments in cognitive estimation, selfmonitoring, and awareness of deficit are common following stroke; thus, the accuracy of
the stroke survivor’s self-assessment of driving skills may be hindered by both the
sequelae of the stroke and by the positive self-bias observed in most adults. In
combination, these phenomena may render stroke survivors particularly poor judges of
their ability to drive safely.
A major gap in the knowledge base is the absence of studies comparing
estimations of fitness to drive with objective indices of fitness to drive. Some research
shows that older drivers—including stroke survivors— report that they compensate for
acquired impairments by strategically limiting their driving exposure; however, the
relation between perceived and actual deficits in driving skills has not been
comprehensively examined. Similarly, a number of studies have shown that significant
others frequently make the decision regarding whether the survivor will resume driving,
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and if so, how frequently and under what conditions they may drive; however, it also has
been shown that significant others’ judgments show only modest relation to objective
indices of the survivor’s fitness to drive, such as neuropsychological functioning or
actual driving incidents. It is therefore important to examine the accuracy of evaluations
of driving ability made by survivors and their significant others. Although the use of
modern technologies in driving simulation with stroke populations is in its infancy,
research indicates that it shows promise as a valid and objective index of driving skill
that provides the opportunity to evaluate stroke survivors in a challenging but safe
environment. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed:
HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1: Among stroke survivors, unawareness of deficits will be inversely
related to driving simulator performance. Furthermore, it is expected that unawareness
of functional and cognitive deficits are more predictive of performance in the simulator
than is unawareness of emotional problems. Unawareness of deficit will be measured
via discrepancies between survivor self-report and informant report of survivors on the
Awareness Questionnaire and the Stroke Impact Scale.
Hypothesis 2: Awareness of deficit moderates accuracy of self-evaluation of
simulator performance. Previous research indicates that significant others often decide
whether the survivor should resume driving; however, it is not clear that they are
accurate judges. This study will extend those findings (Coleman et al., 2002) by using
driving as the outcome criterion rather than performance on neuropsychological
measures. Hypothesis 2 will examine ratings of the survivor’s driving ability made by
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the survivor and the significant other and compare them to survivors’ performance on
the simulator.
Hypothesis 2a predicts that informant ratings of survivors’ physical and cognitive
abilities (assessed via the Stroke Impact Scale (SIS) and the Awareness Questionnaire
(AQ)) will be more strongly correlated with survivor performance on the driving simulator
than will survivor self-ratings.
Hypothesis 2b predicts that awareness of deficit (the discrepancy between
survivors’ SIS and AQ scores) moderates accuracy of survivors’ self-ratings of driving
performance: Among survivors deemed “aware” of their deficits, self-ratings for
simulator performance will be significantly more accurate than unaware survivors’ selfratings for simulator performance.
Hypothesis 3: Individual differences in cognitive estimation ability will predict selfestimation of driving skills on the simulator. Hypothesis 3a predicts that performance on
the Biber Cognitive Estimation Test will be related to self-evaluations of driving skills on
the driving simulator and self-evaluations of cognitive, behavioral/affective, and
motor/sensory abilities: The Biber Cognitive Estimation Test index of estimation
discrepancy (Biber-Z) will be positively correlated with self-evaluations of driving skill.
Thus, participants who overestimate on the Biber (positive Biber-Z score) will also rate
their driving skills on the simulator as high. Additionally, individuals who over- or underestimate on the Biber Cognitive Estimation Test will be less accurate on self-estimates
of their performance in cognitive, behavioral/affective, and motor/sensory abilities (as
assessed by survivor scores on the domains of the Awareness Questionnaire).
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Hypothesis 3b predicts that performance on the Biber Cognitive Estimation Test
will be related to accuracy of self-evaluations of driving skills on the driving simulator:
The Biber Cognitive Estimation Test index of estimation discrepancy (Biber-Z) will be
inversely correlated with discrepancies between reported and actual performance on
the driving simulator. Thus, overestimation on the Biber (positive Biber-Z score) will be
associated with overestimation of performance on the driving simulator (positive
discrepancy Self-rated – Actual simulator score), whereas underestimation on the Biber
(negative Biber Z score) will be associated with underestimation of performance on the
driving simulator.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Participants
A total of 108 adults were included in this study: 54 stroke survivors and 54
significant others of those survivors.

Stroke survivors were at least 3 months post

stroke. Significant others were defined as individuals who knew the survivor prior to his
or her stroke and who were considered by the stroke survivors to be “active” in their life.
Inclusionary criteria for all participants included having driven within 3 months prior to
the survivor’s stroke, ability to understand English, over 18 years old, free from history
of severe psychiatric diagnosis, and able to be tested within 3 weeks of their significant
other. Participants were recruited at discharge from the stroke service at the
Rehabilitation Institute of Michigan (RIM) and during follow-up care at RIM. Additional
participants were recruited from the RIM Driving Education and Training Center, the
Wayne State University Audiology and Speech Language Pathology Program, and from
the community. Each participant was compensated $50 for their participation.
Measures
Doron AMOS (Advanced Mobile Operation System)-2 Driving Simulator. This stateof-the-art simulator is completely interactive and provides 240 degrees of visual field
contained in a life-sized model of a typical automobile cockpit, with sensory feedback
including sound, vibration, and moving air. The evaluation takes approximately 45
minutes and includes four sequences that simulate “real life” encounters: (a) residential
and light business traffic; (b) rural traffic and roadways (including lane changes); (c)
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challenging situations that require forethought and quick response time (e.g., near
collisions, emergency vehicles); and (d) a skills track module that includes assessment
of brake reaction, front-end parking, and distance estimation. The specific driving
scenarios were developed in consultation with RIM’s Driving Evaluation and Training
Center (DETC) Association for Driver Rehabilitation Specialists (ADED) certified
evaluators and the technical consultants at Doron, who are nationally recognized as
leading experts in evaluation and training of driving skills using simulator technology.
The driving scenarios scores yielded a pass/fail score, and an overall total score as well
as scores in the following domains: speed maintenance, lane placement, obeying traffic
signals, stop distance, hazard avoidance, and usage of turn signals.
Awareness Questionnaire (AQ; Sherer, Bergloff, Boake, High, & Levin, 1998). The
AQ was developed as a measure of self-awareness after traumatic brain injury. The 17item survey is completed by stroke survivors about their own abilities while a version of
the form is completed by significant others about the survivor.

The measure was

designed to assess perception of the survivor’s functioning in three domains: cognitive,
behavioral/affective, and motor sensory. The ability to perform various tasks after the
stroke as compared to before the injury are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from "much
worse" to "much better." Although the scale was originally designed for use among
persons with traumatic brain injury, the test authors indicate that it is appropriate for use
in populations with acquired brain injuries (Sherer et al., 1998), and it has been shown
to be valid and reliable among populations other than TBI (Waldron-Perrine, et al.,
2009).
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Stroke Impact Scale (SIS) Version 3.0 (Duncan, Bode, Min Lai, & Perera, 2003).
The SIS is a widely-used measure of functioning post stroke that was developed to
determine the impact of stroke on quality of life within the past 1 to 4 weeks. It may be
used to track changes in impairments and disabilities. The measure is comprised of 59
items tapping eight domains: strength, hand function, mobility, activities of daily living,
emotion, memory, communication, and social participation. The SIS is completed by
both stroke survivors and significant others, providing external criterion validity. Ratings
are provided on 5-point scales specific to the domain being evaluated. The SIS scales
have demonstrated excellent reliability and validity (Duncan et al., 1999; Duncan et al.,
2003). For example, the Physical Scale shows excellent convergent validity with other
criterion measures of stroke severity (e.g., Barthel Index, Functional Independence
Measure, Fugl-Meyer, NIH Stroke Scale, SF-36 Physical Scale, and Duke Mobility
Scale).
Biber Cognitive Estimation Task (BCET – Bullard et al., 2004): The BCET is believed
to tap both executive functioning and semantic memory, requiring individuals to make
reasonable judgments about everyday things. The 20-item test has five questions in
each of four domains: quantity, distance, weight, and time. Individuals must provide
numerical estimates as well as provide labels/units for their answers. Example items
include “How many seeds are there in a watermelon?” and “How long would it take an
adult to hand write a one page letter?” Responses are scored as correct if the estimate
falls within the 5th to 95th percentile of estimates produced by the normative sample;
responses outside the range of those percentiles are considered incorrect. Standard
scoring of the BCET is a sum of correct items. Normative data indicate a test mean of
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18.9 (SD = 1.1) and a range of 16 – 20; thus, the test shows a marked ceiling effect and
restricted range of scores. In the present study, directional quality of responses
(overestimation and underestimation) was examined by calculating a deviation (Z) score
for each item and computing the average deviation score across the 20 items of the test
(BCET-Z; Scott et al., 2009). Thus, a positive score indicated a tendency to
overestimate the answer, whereas a negative score indicated a tendency to
underestimate. Traditional scoring was used to evaluate survivors’ overall performance
on the measure.
Metacognitive Awareness of Context-Specific Cognitive Ability (Ergh, 2004): This
measure borrows from the metacognitive literature and uses Metacognitive Discrepancy
Scores. Procedures and scoring criteria for the Metacognitive Discrepancy Scores were
described by Ergh (2004). The measure was used as follows:

Following the

standardized administration of simulator instructions, the participant was given the
rating scale (see Appendix A) and asked to predict his/her performance in comparison
to same-aged healthy people (prediction of performance). The simulator was then
administered and following this, the participants were again asked to rate their
performance using the same scale (postdiction of performance). After completing all
scenarios within the driving simulator, stroke survivors rated their overall performance in
the simulator with the metacognitive scale.
Demographic

and

other

information:

Information

regarding

age,

gender,

handedness, and level of education was collected for all participants. Additionally, from
survivors, information regarding lesion location was obtained.
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Procedure
Informed consent procedures were completed with all participants (survivors and
significant others) per Institutional Review Board guidelines. Stroke survivors meeting
eligibility qualifications were recruited before discharge from the inpatient unit and asked
if they agreed to be contacted in the future to monitor their recovery. If agreeable, the
survivors completed the consent process and demographic data, lesion location, and
contact information was gathered. Significant others present at the survivor’s discharge
were asked to provide written consent at this time.

Individuals who consented to

participate were informed that they could decline participation when they were later
contacted for the study. Approximately 3 months post stroke, the researcher called
survivors and significant other pairs who had agreed to be contacted. Individuals still
willing to participate gave verbal consent and an appointment to complete the measures
will be scheduled. Participants recruited from other sites gave written consent at first
contact with the researcher and appointments were made to complete the measures
along with their significant other at a future date. All participants were informed that their
performance on all measures, including the driving simulator, was anonymous and thus
would have no impact on their driving status.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Prior to analysis, the data were screened for violations of the assumptions
associated with univariate and multivariate tests.

Variables with non-normal

distributions that may inflate alpha were transformed to improve normality and linearity.
Results of this evaluation led to the overall driving simulator outcome variable to be
winsorized which improved normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006).

Transformed

variables were used in the statistical analyses and are noted where applicable.
Demographics for the study sample are presented in Table 1. Right-side strokes
accounted for 33.3% of survivors, left-side strokes accounted for 51.9% of survivors,
and 14.8% had strokes affecting either both hemispheres or the brain stem. The median
length of time since stroke was 13 months. Approximately two-thirds of the survivors
had resumed driving on the road (61.8%). Motion sickness prevented four participants
from sufficient completion of the driving simulator to produce valid scores.

Among

stroke survivors, 90.9% were able to partake in the comprehensive driving simulator
evaluation.

Demographic variables (education, age, gender, handedness, laterality,

time since stroke, and actual driving status) for the survivors who completed the driving
simulator (n = 50) and those that did not complete the simulator (n = 4) are presented in
Table 2.
The sample was categorized into two groups based on the Awareness
Questionnaire (AQ) results (Sherer, 1998). Awareness of deficit was calculated as the
discrepancy between survivor self-report and informant-report on the survivor on the
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AQ: AQ Discrepancy = (AQ self-report) – (AQ Significant Other report). Twenty
participants were classified as showing impaired awareness of deficit (positive AQ
Difference scores), whereas 34 participants were classified as intact (n = 34; AQ
Difference scores near zero or negative). Classification was based on the AQ
Discrepancy Total Score; for exploratory analyses, discrepancy scores were also
calculated for the three domains assessed by the AQ (cognitive, behavioral/affective,
and motor/sensory). Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample (total and by
awareness group) on the AQ variables (self-report, significant-other report, and
discrepancy scores), as well as the simulator variables.

Demographics are also

presented for survivors with intact (n = 34) and impaired awareness (n = 20) of their
deficits (Table 4). Chi-square tests indicated that men and women (p = .61), location of
stroke (p = .76), and driving status (p = .40) did not differ across level of awareness.
ANOVAs indicated that awareness of deficits was not associated with significant
differences on survivor age, education, or time since stroke (all ps > .30).
Seventy-four percent of survivors failed the driving simulator evaluation and 26%
passed the evaluation. When examining the interaction of awareness of deficit and
pass/fail status, a chi-square analysis (X2 (1, N = 50) = 2.09, p = .32) indicated that level
of awareness did not significantly predict whether survivors would pass or fail the
simulator evaluation. Among survivors with intact awareness of deficit, 27% passed the
evaluation and 73% failed the simulator evaluation. Similarly, 26% of survivors with
impaired awareness of deficit passed the driving simulator evaluation and 74% of
survivors with impaired awareness failed the evaluation.
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Significant others (SOs), who were nominated by survivors as someone who
knew them well and who had been active in the stroke survivor’s recovery, included
49.1% spouses or romantic partners, 21.3% children of the survivor, 3.7% parents of
the survivor, 15.7% other family members of the survivor (e.g. sibling), and 8.3%
described as a friend or other. Demographics for significant others are presented in
Table 5.
Hypothesis 1: Awareness of deficits and simulator performance
The hypothesis that awareness of deficit is related to simulator driving
performance was tested with correlational analysis. Table 6 presents the correlations of
awareness of deficit indices with the simulator outcomes. Among the total sample of
stroke survivors (N = 54), overall unawareness of deficits was inversely related to
simulator performance (r = -.31, p = .01). Survivors with less awareness of their deficits
were worse drivers than were survivors with intact awareness of their deficits.
Consistent with the hypothesis, unawareness of cognitive and motor/sensory skills
showed a stronger inverse relationship to driving performance (r = -.33, p = .008 and r =
-.40, p = .001 respectively) than did awareness of the emotional/behavioral domain (r =
-.18, p = .10).
As shown in Table 3, mean Simulator Total score was higher for the group with
intact awareness than for the group with impaired awareness; however, an independent
t test indicated that the difference was not significant, t(52) = 1.36, p = .09, d = .38.
Prediction of simulator performance was related to awareness of overall deficit (r
= .22, p = .05); however, there was less difference across the individual domains of
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awareness in their relationships to predicted performance than to actual performance,
with correlations to the separate domains of awareness ranging from .17 (cognitive) to
.25 (behavioral/affective abilities).

Postdiction of simulator performance showed a

pattern similar to prediction: It was related to overall awareness of deficit (r = .22, p =
.06), with correlations in the individual domains of awareness ranging from .14
(motor/sensory) to .28 (behavioral/affective). Among the total sample, actual simulator
performance was related to simulator prediction (r = .21, p = .07) and simulator
postdiction (r = .33, p = .01).

Simulator prediction and postdiction were modestly

correlated (r = .45, p = .001) with one another.
Lastly, of interest are the modest to strong correlations between indices of
survivors’ awareness of deficit and indices of accuracy in self-estimated performance on
the driving simulator evaluation (rs .31 to .53). Accuracy of prediction was represented
as the difference between predicted simulator performance and actual simulator
performance (Prediction Accuracy = Predicted – Actual performance); therefore,
positive T scores reflect overestimation of actual performance. For accuracy of
prediction, about 15% of survivors underestimated their performance, another 25%
were within 10 T points of their actual performance, 30% overestimated their
performance by 10 - 20 T points, and 30% overestimated by > 20 T points. For
survivors' postdiction accuracy, about 20% underestimated their performance and 24%
were within 10 T points of their actual performance, whereas 39% overestimated by 10 20 T points and 18% of survivors overestimated by >20 T points. As shown in Table 6,
the overall awareness of deficit index (AQ Difference Total) showed modest to strong
relation to both prediction accuracy and postdiction accuracy, with awareness of
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motor/sensory deficits the most strongly correlated of the AQ domains with prediction
accuracy (r = .49) and postdiction accuracy (r = .53). Consistent with the hypothesis, r to
z analyses comparing the magnitude of correlations between awareness of
motor/sensory deficits and prediction accuracy and awareness of behavioral/affective
deficits and prediction accuracy indicated that awareness of motor/sensory deficits was
significantly more strongly related to prediction accuracy than was awareness of
behavioral/affective deficits (t(51) = 1.80, p = .04). Similarly, there was a strong similar
trend for postdiction accuracy and awareness of motor/sensory deficits and postdiction
accuracy and awareness of behavioral/affective deficits (t(51) = 1.65, p = .05). R to z
analyses comparing the magnitude of prediction accuracy and awareness of cognitive
deficits versus prediction accuracy and awareness of behavioral/affective deficits (t(51)
= 1.20, p = 0.12) and the magnitude of prediction accuracy and awareness of cognitive
deficits versus prediction accuracy and awareness of motor/sensory deficits (t(51) = 1.05, p = 0.15) were not significant. Additional r to z analyses that did not reach levels of
significance included correlations between postdiction accuracy and awareness of
behavioral/affective deficits and postdiction accuracy and awareness of cognitive
deficits (t(51)= -1.37, p = 0.09) and postdiction accuracy and awareness of
motor/sensory deficits and postdiction accuracy and awareness of cognitive deficits
(t(51) = 0.68, p = 0.75). Thus, as awareness of deficit becomes increasingly impaired
(high scores indicated impaired awareness), self-estimated performance is increasingly
overpredicted (high accuracy scores indicate overestimation of actual performance).
Driving Simulator Performance: Logistic Regression

34
A logistic regression examined the prediction of driving simulator performance
(pass, fail), whereas multiple regression analysis examined the prediction of driving
simulator performance (total score on driving simulator). Predictor variables for these
regression analyses included survivor’s age, stroke severity (SIS – Physical Scale), and
awareness of deficit in cognitive, behavioral affective, and motor domains (AQ
difference).
A test of the full model with the five predictors against the constant-only model
was significant, X2 (5, N = 48) = 14.31, Nagelkerke R2 = .37, p = .01, indicating that the
set of predictors reliably distinguished between survivors who passed and failed the
driving simulator evaluation. The model correctly classified 85.4% of cases, with 97.1%
of failing survivors and 53.8% of passing survivors correctly classified. Using the Wald
criterion, age (p = .06, odds ratio 0.92), stroke severity (p = .04, odds ratio = 1.06), and
awareness of behavioral/affective abilities (p = .03, odds ratio = 9.73) made significant
contributions to predicting whether a survivor passed or failed the driving simulator.
Driving Simulator Performance: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed to examine the
prediction of total score on the driving simulator by survivor’s age, stroke severity, and
awareness of cognitive, behavioral/affective, and motor deficits. The results of the
multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 7. After step 1, age and stroke
severity, R2 = .10, F(2, 47) = 2.54, p = .09. When the remaining predictors were entered
into the equation after step 2 (awareness of cognitive, behavioral/affective, and motoric
abilities), they reliably improved the prediction of simulator performance by 24%. The
overall model predicted 34% of the variance in simulator performance and was
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significant, F(5, 47) = 4.41, p = .003. Examination of the squared correlations indicate
that awareness of motor or physical deficits (sri2 = .12) contributed the most unique
variance to the prediction of driving simulator performance, followed by awareness of
behavioral/affective deficits (sri2 = .10), age (sri2 = .07), stroke severity (sri2 = .04), and
awareness of cognitive deficits (sri2 = .02).
Hypothesis 2: Awareness of deficit moderates accuracy of self-evaluation of
simulator performance
Awareness status and Self-Estimations of Driving Simulator Performance
The moderation effect was tested first via split-plot correlation analyses of
predicted and postdicted estimations to actual simulator performance. Table 8 presents
correlations between driving simulator indices for stroke survivors with intact (n = 34)
and impaired (n = 20) awareness of deficit. Simulator prediction and postdiction were
significantly related to one another among survivors with intact (r = .42) and impaired (r
= .41) awareness of deficits. Among survivors with intact awareness of their deficits,
simulator prediction (r = .32) and postdiction (r = .25) showed moderate relationships to
actual simulator performance (i.e., self-estimates of performance corresponded to
actual performance). Of note, unlike their counterparts with intact awareness of deficits,
predicted simulator performance was not significantly related to actual simulator
performance among survivors with impaired awareness; however, actual simulator
performance was strongly related to postdiction ratings (r = .53). Therefore, among the
impaired awareness group, self-estimates of performance did not correspond to actual
performance before the simulator experience (prediction) but strongly corresponded to
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actual performance after the simulator experience (postdiction). Overall, awareness of
deficit moderated self-evaluation of performance before and after the experience of
driving the simulator.
Informant versus Survivor Ratings of Survivors’ Abilities and Driving Simulator
Performance
Descriptive statistics for indices of survivors' cognitive, behavioral/affective, and
motor /sensory abilities as rated by the survivor (self-report) and by the informants
indicated that both stroke survivors and significant others rated survivors’ current
cognitive

(1.8

and

1.4

respectively),

motor/sensory

(1.62

and

1.26),

and

behavioral/affective (1.85 and 1.56) abilities as a “little worse” to “about the same” as
they were prior to their stroke, where 0 = “much worse” and 5 = “much better” (Table 3).
Accuracy of estimated performance by self- and informant-rated abilities
Further examination of survivors’ relative capacities to evaluate their abilities was
conducted on the accuracy of predicted and postdicted scores. Table 8 shows a fairly
consistent pattern of positive correlations between survivor self-ratings and the
accuracy of their estimated simulator performance, as compared to inverse correlations
between SO-ratings of the survivors and the accuracy of survivors’ estimations of their
simulator performance. As shown in Table 8, accuracy of prediction (i.e., Prediction
Accuracy = Predicted – Actual performance) was related to self-ratings overall (r = .33);
in the individual domains it related to cognitive ability (r = .30, p = .01) and motor
sensory ability (r = .40, p = .002) but showed weaker relation to self-ratings of
behavioral/affective ability (r = .22, p = .06). The same pattern of findings was apparent
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with accuracy of postdiction (i.e., Postdiction Accuracy = Postdicted – Actual
performance), which was related to self-ratings overall (r = .34) and in individual
domains more strongly to cognitive ability (r = .33, p = .01) and motor sensory ability (r =
.43, p = .001) with weaker relation to self-ratings of behavioral/affective abilities (r = .21,
p = .07). Therefore, increases in self-ratings of cognitive and motor/sensory abilities
were associated with overestimations of actual simulator performance prior to the task
(prediction accuracy) and after completing the task (postdiction accuracy). In contrast,
accuracy of predicted and postdicted performance showed trends toward inverse
relation to SO reports of the survivors’ abilities. Accuracy of survivor’s prediction ratings
showed inverse relation to SO’s ratings overall (r = -.23, p = .05); within the specific
domains, to the survivors’ cognitive abilities (r = -.22, p = .06), behavioral/affective
abilities (r = -.18, p = .09) and motor/sensory abilities (r = -.20, p = .08). Accuracy of
postdiction ratings showed a similar and somewhat stronger pattern: significant inverse
relation to SOs’ ratings of the survivors’ overall abilities (r = -.30, p = .02), with
correlations for specific domains cognitive (r = -.28, p = .02), behavioral/affective (r = .27, p = .03) and a similar trend for motor/sensory abilities (r = -.21, p = .07). Survivors
objectively rated as having recovered the most from their strokes made more accurate
predictions and postdictions of their simulator performance than did survivors with
significant cognitive, behavioral/affective, and motor/sensory deficits.
Fisher’s r-to-z analyses were conducted to compare whether the differences in
correlations between survivors’ and significant others’ ratings of abilities and accuracy
of prediction and postdiction were significant. The difference in the magnitudes of
correlations between prediction accuracy and survivors’ ratings of overall abilities and
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significant others’ ratings of overall abilities was significant (z = -2.91, p = .00). Also
significantly different were the correlations between prediction accuracy and the
awareness subscales: survivor ratings of cognitive abilities and SO ratings of survivors’
cognitive abilities (z = 2.69, p = .00); survivor ratings of behavioral/affective abilities and
SO ratings of behavioral/affective abilities (z = 2.04, p = .02); and survivor ratings of
motor/sensory abilities and SO ratings of survivors’ motor sensory abilities (z = 3.16, p <
.01). The magnitude of correlations between postdiction accuracy and survivors ratings
of overall abilities and SO’s ratings of overall abilities was significant (z = 3.52, p < .01).
Again, the magnitude of correlations between survivors’ postdiction accuracy and
survivors and significant others ratings of survivors’ abilities on awareness domains
were compared and found significant: Postdiction accuracy and survivor ratings of
cognitive abilities and SO ratings of survivors’ cognitive abilities (z = 3.18, p < .01);
survivor ratings of behavioral/affective abilities and SO ratings of behavioral/affective
abilities (z = 2.47, p = .01); and survivor ratings of motor/sensory abilities and SO
ratings of survivors’ motor sensory abilities (z = 3.40, p < .01).
In the total sample, as SO ratings of survivors decreased (i.e., rated as more
impaired), survivors’ estimation accuracy was worse. In contrast, as survivors’ selfratings increased, self-estimation accuracy worsened (more discrepant from actual).
The correlations for the two awareness groups between simulator indices and both selfratings and SO-ratings of survivors’ abilities also are shown in Table 8. In general, they
show a pattern similar to that observed in the total sample, but the magnitudes are
much weaker by comparison, likely due to restriction of range.
Independent t test indicated that there was a significant difference in prediction of
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simulator performance between the awareness groups, t(51) = -1.90, p = .03, d = .53.
The means for the prediction of performance were in the direction indicating that
survivors who are more aware of their deficits made a lower estimate of their driving skill
(M = 50.21, SD = 6.68) than did those who had impaired awareness of their deficits (M
= 54.18, SD = 8.41).

There was also a significant difference between awareness

groups on postdiction of simulator performance, t(49) = -1.81, p = .04, d = .51. Similarly,
the means for the postdiction of performance were in the direction indicating that
survivors who had intact awareness of deficits made a lower evaluation of their driving
skill (M = 46.73, SD = 5.39) than did those who had impaired awareness of their deficits
(M = 50.05, SD = 7.71). Additionally, an independent t test (with Levene’s correction for
heterogeneity of variance) indicated that awareness groups differed significantly in their
accuracy of prediction, t(28.55) = -2.22, p = .02, d = .68 whereas another independent t
test found awareness groups differed significantly in their accuracy of postdiction t(49)
= -3.22, p = .001, d = .91. The means for the accuracy of prediction and postdiction
were in the direction indicating that survivors who had intact awareness of deficits made
more accurate estimates of their driving skill (M = 11.72, SD = 11.03 and M = 7.45, SD
= 10.21, respectively) than did those who had impaired awareness of their deficits (M =
21.26, SD = 17.25 and M = 18.36, SD = 13.92, respectively).
Next, to examine survivors' relative capacities to evaluate their abilities,
correlational analyses were conducted to determine whether informant ratings of
survivors’ physical and cognitive abilities were more strongly correlated with survivor
performance on the driving simulator than were survivor self-ratings of the same
abilities. Table 8 presents correlations of self-ratings and SO-ratings of survivors with
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the simulator evaluation indices for the total sample and the two awareness of deficit
groups. Among the total sample, survivor self-ratings of behavioral/affective abilities (r
= -.07) were unrelated to driving simulator performance (as measured by the simulator
total score) whereas self-ratings of physical (r = -.29) and cognitive (r = -.24) abilities
showed significant inverse correlations with driving ability (Table 8). Point-biserial
correlations indicated that survivors’ ratings of their behavioral/affective (rpb = .08, p =
.30) and motor sensory (rpb = -.10, p = .24) abilities were not significantly related to their
pass/fail status on the simulator; however, self-ratings of cognitive abilities were related
(rpb = -.20, p = .08) to pass/fail status. Contrary to the proposed hypothesis, significant
others’ reports of stroke survivors’ cognitive (r = .17) and behavioral/affective (r = -.16)
abilities were not significantly related to the survivors’ driving performance in the
simulator as measured by the simulator total score (Table 8); the significant others’
reports of survivors’ motor/sensory abilities (r = .21, p = .06) were weakly related to the
simulator total score (Table 8).

The significant others’ ratings of stroke survivors’

abilities were not significantly related to the pass/fail status of stroke survivors on the
driving simulator (rpb .02 to .09).
As shown in Table 8, correlations for the separate groups of survivors with intact
and impaired awareness of their deficits were generally small and nonsignificant,
possibly reflecting restriction of range. Neither self-ratings nor SO ratings of survivors’
abilities were well related to actual simulator performance, predicted simulator
performance, or postdicted simulator performance for either group, with a few notable
exceptions. Among the group with intact awareness of deficits, SO-ratings of
motor/sensory abilities were significantly correlated with actual simulator performance (r
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= .32), as well as predicted (r = .42) and postdicted (r = .37) performance. Survivor
ratings of the motor/sensory domain were also significantly correlated with predicted
performance (r = .34) among the intact awareness group.
Overall, the survivors’ and informants’ ratings of the survivors abilities showed
weaker relation to actual simulator performance than did the awareness of deficit
indexes that were generated from the differences between their ratings.
In sum, Hypothesis 2 was largely confirmed: Awareness of deficit moderated the
accuracy of self-evaluation of simulator performance. Among survivors with intact
awareness of their deficits, prediction and postdiction self-ratings of performance were
related to actual driving performance. Among survivors with impaired awareness of their
deficits, only postdiction correlated with actual driving performance. In contrast to the
hypothesis, significant others’ reports of survivors’ abilities were not as strongly related
to actual driving performance as were survivors’ self reports of those same abilities.
Additionally, the objective and self-ratings of the survivors’ abilities showed weaker
relation to actual simulator performance than did the awareness of deficit indexes that
were generated from the differences between their ratings. Further, as objective ratings
of survivors’ abilities decreased, the accuracy of survivors’ estimation was worse. In
comparison, as survivors ratings of themselves increased, their accuracy of estimation
was worse.
Hypothesis 3: Cognitive estimation ability predicts self-estimation of driving skills
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for the sample (total and by awareness
group) on the BCET variables (traditional and Z scoring). Independent t tests indicated
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that survivors with intact and impaired awareness of deficits differed on their estimation
of quantity with traditional BCET scoring (t(50) = 2.60, p < .01, d = .75). Independent t
tests indicated that awareness of deficits was not otherwise associated with significant
differences on cognitive estimation tests (all ps > .12).
Cognitive Estimation and Self-Estimation
To determine whether general skills in cognitive estimation were related to selfevaluations of driving skills on the simulator, correlational analyses were conducted
between the BCET and driving simulator indices (Table 10). Differences in findings were
apparent when different methods of scoring the BCET were instituted. When using
BCET Z scores and examining the total sample of stroke participants, simulator
prediction was correlated with general cognitive estimation skill (r = .46, p = .00). Actual
simulator performance (r = .10, p = .25) and simulator postdiction (r = .08, p = .29) were
unrelated to cognitive estimation among the total sample. Among survivors with intact
awareness, general cognitive estimation skill was related to simulator prediction (r = .41,
p = .008) but not to simulator postdiction (r = .02, p = .46) or actual simulator
performance (r = .06, p = .36). A strong positive relationship was also found between
simulator prediction and general cognitive estimation skill among the group with
impaired awareness (r = .56, p = .01). A Fisher’s r to z analysis indicated that the
magnitude of the correlations between intact and impaired survivors and prediction of
driving ability and general cognitive estimation skill was not significant (z = -0.65, p =
.74). Similar to survivors with intact awareness, simulator postdiction (r = .21, p = .22)
and actual simulator performance (r = .10, p = .35) were not substantially related to
cognitive estimation among stroke survivors with impaired awareness. When using
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traditional scoring methods for the BCET and examining the total survivor sample,
general cognitive estimation was related to actual driving performance (r = .23, p = .05)
but not related to prediction (r = .05, p = .36) or postdiction (r = .16, p = .14) of driving
ability. Among survivors with intact awareness, general cognitive estimation was not
related to actual driving performance (r = .26, p = .07) or predicted (r = -.01, p = .49) or
postdicted (r = .27, p = .06) ability to drive although there was a small trend toward
significance for actual and postdicted performance. There were no significant
correlations between general cognitive estimation and actual driving ability (r = .16, p =
.27) and prediction (r = .19, p = .23) or postdiction (r = .11, p = .34) of ability for
survivors with impaired awareness of deficits.
Correlational analyses were also conducted comparing cognitive estimation and
self-evaluations of cognitive, behavioral, or motor/sensory abilities (Table 11). In the
total sample, cognitive estimation (as determined with the Z scores) and self-ratings of
cognitive abilities (r = .05, p = .34) and motor/sensory abilities (r = .09, p = .26) were not
related. Cognitive estimation was also not meaningfully related to the survivors’
behavioral/affective abilities (r = .18, p = .10). For survivors with intact awareness,
cognitive estimation and survivor self-estimates of cognitive abilities (r = .34, p = .02 and
motor/sensory abilities (r = .37, p = .02) were significantly related, with a similar trend
observed for behavioral/affective abilities (r = .28, p = .06).

Among survivors with

impaired awareness, cognitive estimation and survivor self-estimates of cognitive
abilities (r = -.06, p = .41), behavioral/affective abilities (r = .22, p = .19), and
motor/sensory abilities (r = -.03, p = .46) were not significantly related. When using
traditional scoring of the BCET, correlations between survivor rated abilities and general
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cognitive estimation mostly ranged from moderate to strong.

Among all survivors,

cognitive estimation was significantly related to self-rated cognitive (r = -.46, p = .00),
behavioral/affective (r = -.35, p = .01), and motor/sensory (r = -.45, p = .00) abilities. For
survivors with intact awareness of deficits, cognitive estimation was significantly related
to self-rated cognitive abilities (r = -.41, p = .01) but not to survivor opinions of
behavioral/affective (r = -.19, p = .14) or motor/sensory abilities (r = -.19, p = .14). The
relationship between cognitive estimation and self-rated cognitive (r = -.51, p = .02),
behavioral/affective (r = -.46, p = .03), and motor/sensory (r = -.66, p < .01) abilities was
strong amongst survivors with impaired awareness of deficits.
Cognitive Estimation and Accuracy of Self-Estimates of Driving Skill
Accuracy of prediction (z scoring: r = .12, p = .19; traditional scoring: r = -.20, p =
.09) and postdiction (z scoring: r = -.09, p = .28; traditional scoring: r = -.19, p = .10) was
unrelated to general cognitive estimation skill among survivors. Among survivors with
intact awareness, prediction (z scoring: r = .19, p = .15; traditional scoring: r = -.27, p =
.07) and postdiction (z scoring: r = -.08, p = .34; traditional scoring: r = -.25 , p = .09)
were not significantly related to cognitive estimation (Table 10).

Similarly, among

survivors with impaired awareness, cognitive estimation was not significantly related to
prediction (z scoring: r = .12, p = .32; traditional scoring: r = -.06, p = .41) and
postdiction (z scoring: r = -.05, p = .43; traditional scoring: r = .00 , p = .50).
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
Impaired awareness of deficits among stroke survivors predicted poor driving
performance in the simulator.

The findings indicated that awareness of cognitive

deficits and motor/sensory deficits were more strongly associated with driving
performance than was awareness of behavioral and affective problems. These findings
were paralleled in general cognitive estimation skills: Persons who tended to
overestimate external things like quantity, distance and time also overestimated
(overpredicted) their driving skills.

Additionally, awareness of deficit moderated

survivors’ accuracy of self-evaluation of driving skill: Survivors with intact awareness of
their deficits showed ability to predict their actual driving performance prior to driving in
the simulator and evaluate their performance accurately after driving the simulator. In
contrast, survivors with impaired awareness of deficits showed poor prediction of their
actual performance in the driving simulator; however, the accuracy of their selfevaluations improved substantially after completing the driving simulator task
(postdiction).
Survivors with intact or impaired awareness of deficit did not differ in age,
education, or time since stroke and their cognitive, behavioral/affective, and
motor/sensory abilities were evaluated as a little worse to about the same as they were
prior to their strokes. Age, stroke severity, and awareness of deficits provided unique
information about fitness to drive. When considering overall driving skills, as predicted,
awareness of motor/sensory deficits contributed the most substantial value to the
prediction of driving ability, followed by awareness of behavioral/affective deficits, age,
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stroke severity, and awareness of cognitive deficits. In determining whether survivors
passed a driving evaluation, age, stroke severity, and awareness of behavioral/affective
deficits uniquely contributed to driving performance.

These findings suggest that

evaluating survivors’ awareness of deficit is an important factor in determining fitness to
drive.
Awareness of Deficit and Driving Performance
Survivors with impaired awareness of their deficits were worse drivers than were
survivors with intact awareness of their deficits. Specifically, impaired awareness of
cognitive and especially motor/sensory deficits predicted poor driving, and they were
substantially stronger predictors than was awareness of emotional and behavioral
deficits. These findings support previous research showing that awareness of disability
moderates driving outcomes (Ryan et al., 2009).

It also expands the literature by

replicating Ryan et al.’s (2009) finding in a different neurologically impaired population
and with a different outcome measure of driving (driving simulator versus driving
records).
The source of ability estimates and how these opinions predicted driving
simulator performance was important. Survivors’ estimates of physical and cognitive
abilities were more strongly related to survivor performance on the driving simulator
than were informant estimates of the same abilities. Contrary to prediction, there was
not a strong link between significant others’ opinions of stroke survivors’ cognitive,
motor/sensory, and behavioral/affective abilities and the survivors’ driving. Previous
research (Coleman et al., 2002; Scott et al., 2009) has shown that significant others
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often decide whether stroke survivors resume driving but often do so without
considering objective indices of fitness to drive. The present findings may suggest that
even if presented with objective evidence of survivors’ abilities, significant others
consider other factors and do not make decisions about survivors’ resumption of driving
based on objective evidence.

Another explanation for the findings is that although

significant others are accurately estimating survivors' cognitive, behavioral/affective, and
motor/sensory deficits, the survivors’ awareness of those deficits is actually more
pertinent to driving ability. Indeed, these findings indicate that survivors' awareness of
their deficits was a stronger indicator of driving performance than were survivor or
significant other estimates of survivors’ abilities alone.
In support of the theory that awareness is multidimensional and may vary across
domains (see Orfei et al., 2007 for a review), differential awareness of cognitive,
motor/sensory, and behavioral/affective deficits was suggested by the differential
relationships between these domains and simulator performance in this study. Poor
awareness of cognitive and motor/sensory deficits was strongly predictive of poor
performance in the driving simulator whereas awareness of behavioral/affective deficits
was unrelated to simulator performance. Individuals with impaired awareness of their
behavioral/affective deficits overestimated their driving skills prior to and after a driving
evaluation whereas individuals with impaired awareness of their motor/sensory deficits
overpredicted their driving skills prior to the evaluation.

Impaired awareness of

cognitive deficits was not associated with prediction or postdiction of driving skill. It may
be also be that poor awareness of cognitive and motor/sensory skills, and therefore the
lack of feedback about these skills, is particularly detrimental to a survivor’s ability to
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predict and adjust ratings of their driving ability. Stroke survivors’ ability to accurately
predict driving skills prior to resuming driving after stroke and then make accurate
estimations of driving performance is clearly important in ensuring both the safety of the
survivor and other drivers on the road. If survivors predict they will not be able to
resume driving safely, or if they return to driving and recognize that their driving skills
are insufficient, they can seek out drivers’ rehabilitation training or alternative methods
of transportation.
Awareness of deficit moderates accuracy of self-evaluation of simulator performance
Among survivors aware of their deficits, prediction and postdiction of driving skill
were modestly related to actual simulator performance; among survivors unaware of
their deficits, only postdiction estimates were related to actual driving skill. One possible
explanation for this pattern of self-evaluation is that although survivors in general may
overestimate their driving ability (Scott et al., 2009) survivors with impaired awareness
of deficits overestimate their level of driving skill and underappreciate their deficits.
Therefore, survivors with impaired awareness of their deficits were less likely to
accurately predict their driving skills; however, after driving, their self-evaluations were
strongly associated with their actual performance and the accuracy of their selfevaluations improved substantially. Thus, survivors with impaired awareness of their
deficits benefitted substantially from the experience in terms of improved accuracy of
self-evaluation and they benefitted more than did the participants with intact awareness.
Groeger and Grande’s work (1996) suggests that feedback provided about driving skill
may be beneficial in improving the accuracy of an individual’s estimate of a specific
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driving behavior; however, overall opinion of driving ability is not influenced by instructor
feedback on an actual driving task.
Although the present study indicates that stroke survivors may have sufficient
cognitive flexibility to adjust their awareness of deficits, and therefore may be able to
adjust their driving accordingly, it is unclear how long the improved insight into driving
skill may last. It is unclear whether survivors would alter their opinions of themselves as
a driver overall or would change the accuracy of their predictions of driving skills at
some point in the future.

Despite this unanswered question, the potential positive

influence of using the driving simulator as an intervention to improve both driving skills
and accuracy of self-evaluation of those skills warrants further investigation.
Additionally, as survivors' opinions of their general abilities improved, they
became less accurate in their self-estimates of driving skill.

This relationship was

observed for self-estimates of cognitive and motor/sensory abilities but not for
behavioral/affective abilities and it suggests a tendency for overestimation across
domains among stroke survivors. In contrast, survivors’ perspectives of their cognitive,
behavioral/affective, and motor/sensory abilities were not related to whether survivors
passed the driving evaluation. Interestingly, significant others’ perspectives on survivors’
behavioral/affective abilities were related to whether they passed the driving evaluation.
As survivors’ ability to manage their behavior and affective experiences declined, as per
significant others’ report, survivors became more likely to fail the driving evaluation. It is
likely that methodological issues account for the limited predictive value of pass/fail
status on the driving simulator. Due to its dichotomous nature, pass/fail outcome was
less sensitive than the continuous simulator outcome in evaluating driving skill.
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Additionally, the pass/fail outcome included survivors recommended to drive with
restrictions or after remediation of skill and survivors who may have driven well
throughout the evaluation except for one significant error, such as causing a major
accident. These factors reflect the non-linear nature of the pass-fail designation.
In Scott et al. (2009), overestimation of driving ability (as compared to an
"average driver") was mirrored on a performance task. This research extends that work
by demonstrating that overestimation of driving ability (accuracy of actual driving
performance) was mirrored in overestimation of ability to perform life skills.
Furthermore, as significant others' evaluations of survivors' abilities improved, so did the
accuracy of survivors estimates of their own driving skill. This supports the use of
significant others as accurate informants on survivors’ abilities.
Cognitive Estimation and Self-Estimation of Driving Ability
Cognitive estimation has been described as a process of using readily-available
common knowledge in a novel manner to answer a question for which an exact answer
is not known (Shallice & Evans, 1978). Although much of the prior research on cognitive
estimation has focused on its relationship to other cognitive skills (Axelrod & Millis,
1994; Brand et al., 2003; Bullard et al., 2004), Scott et al. (2009) found that
overestimation on general cognitive estimation tasks was related to overestimation of
driving skills.

This work adds to the current literature by extending these findings:

Survivors general tendency to over- and underestimate cognitive skills was associated
with prediction of performance on the simulator in both survivors with intact and
impaired awareness of their deficits. This relationship was stronger amongst survivors
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with impaired awareness of their deficits. Additionally, cognitive estimation was
modestly related to awareness of cognitive and motor/sensory abilities among survivors
with intact awareness of deficit such that the more accurate survivors were in their
cognitive estimation, the more favorably they evaluated their abilities.

However,

cognitive estimation scores were minimally related to actual driving performance and
not related to postdiction or the accuracy of self-evaluations of driving skills on the
simulator.

The present findings support the idea that an underlying mechanism of

estimation pervades cognition and sense of self (Scott et al., 2009).

However, it

appears that feedback on performance (through actual driving experience) or having
additional data to use in making estimates may alter survivors’ awareness of their
abilities. This may provide a unique opportunity to raise stroke survivors’ awareness of
driving ability and improve driving safety.
Conclusions and implications
In conclusion, the present study demonstrated that knowledge of survivors’
awareness of deficit provides substantial information in understanding survivors’ driving
ability.

Awareness of deficit was related to actual driving skill.

More specifically,

awareness of cognitive and motor/sensory deficits was related to actual driving skill
whereas awareness of behavioral/affective deficits was related to prediction and
postdiction of driving skill. Awareness of deficit was also strongly associated with the
accuracy of prediction and post-evaluation estimates made by stroke survivors.
Survivors with intact awareness of deficit demonstrated better driving skills and were
more accurate in their prediction of these driving skills as compared to survivors with
impaired awareness of their deficits. Survivors with impaired awareness of deficit
demonstrated substantially improved accuracy in their postdiction as compared to

52
survivors with intact awareness of deficit. Thus, the opportunity to drive in a simulator
appeared beneficial to survivors in that when provided with feedback, survivors became
better at evaluating their level of driving skill. Potentially, survivors could use this
information to alter their driving habits. Awareness of deficit was also associated with
cognitive estimation.

Among survivors with intact awareness of deficit, survivors’

opinions of their abilities were associated with cognitive estimation skill, however;
among survivors who were unaware of their deficits, estimates of abilities and cognitive
estimation were unrelated. Cognitive estimation was related to driving ability in that
persons who overestimated on a cognitive estimation task overestimated driving skill,
but it was not related to accuracy of predictions or postdictions of driving skill. The
findings together suggest that stroke survivors may benefit from interventions to
improve awareness of deficit.
However, the generalizability of the findings is limited by the relatively small
sample size and relatively low power. Furthermore, the large number of tests that were
run increased experiment-wise alpha. On-road assessment is the gold-standard for
driving evaluation and the design of the study could have been improved if survivors
completed an on-road evaluation in addition to the driving simulator.

Although the

simulator and driving scenarios were designed to be life-like, driving in the simulator
was a novel experience for the participants and it may be that their estimates of
performance would have been different if they were driving on-road. Another limitation
of this study is the characteristics of the present sample who were, on average, younger
than typical stroke survivors who may have had multiple strokes. A larger sample of
survivors and the inclusion of other neurologically impaired populations would likely
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improve generalizability.

Future research should examine the relationship between

training on the driving simulator and on-road driving assessments to evaluate if there is
temporal stability of increased awareness of driving ability.
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APPENDIX A
Table 1. Demographic Statistics for Stroke Survivors (N = 54).

Variable

M

SD

Range

Age (years)

55.6

(9.7)

32 – 81

Education (years)

14.1

(2.4)

9 – 20

Percent Men

54.5

Percent Right Handed

96.3

(75.3)

3 - 328

Stroke Survivors

Location of stroke (%)
Left

51.9

Right

33.3

Bilateral or other

14.8

Percent driving

61.1

Time since stroke (months)

44.3
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Table 2. Demographic Statistics of Survivors who Completed the Simulator and Did Not
Complete the Simulator.

Group
Survivor Simulator
Completers (n = 50)
Variable

Survivors Simulator
Incomplete (n = 4)

M

SD

M

SD

Age (years)

55.4

10.0

58.5

4.4

Education (years)

13.9

2.3

16.3

1.3

Percent Male

58.0

25.0

Percent Right Handed

96.0

100.0

Left

50.0

75.0

Right

34.0

25.0

Bilateral/other

16.0

0

Laterality

Time since stroke (months)

45.5

Percent driving

60.0

78.2

29.3
75.0

14.7
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Awareness Groups (Intact n = 34, Impaired n = 20) and
the Total Sample (N = 54).
Group
Intact
(n = 34)

Impaired
(n = 20)

Total
(N = 54)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Range

Total Score

25.2 (6.2)

38.0 (13.6)

29.9 (11.4)

16.0 – 68.0

Cognitive Subscale

1.5 (0.5)

2.3 (0.9)

1.8 (0.8)

0.7 – 4.0

Behavioral/Affective Subscale

1.6 (0.5)

2.3 (0.8)

1.9 (0.7)

0.5 – 4.0

Motor/Sensory Subscale

1.4 (0.5)

2.1 (0.9)

1.6 (0.7)

0.3 – 4.0

Total Score

28.5 (7.4)

19.3 (8.3)

24.2 (7.9)

8.0 – 39.0

Cognitive Subscale

1.7 (0.5)

1.1 (0.5)

1.4 (0.5)

0.1 – 2.1

Behavioral/Affective Subscale

1.8 (0.6)

1.3 (0.6)

1.6 (0.6)

0.3 – 3.3

Motor/Sensory Subscale

1.4 (0.4)

1.1 (0.5)

1.6 (0.5)

0.5 – 2.0

AQ Discrepancy Total

-0.2 (0.4)

1.1 (0.6)

0.3 (0.8)

8.0 – 39.0

AQ Discrepancy - Cognitive

-0.2 (0.4)

1.2 (0.7)

0.3 (0.9)

0.1 – 2.1

AQ Discrepancy - Motor/Sensory

-0.03 (0.5)

1.0 (0.7)

0.4 (0.8)

0.3 – 3.3

AQ Discrepancy - Behavioral/Affective

-0.3 (0.6)

1.1 (0.7)

0.2 (0.9)

0.5 – 2.0

Simulator Overall (T Score)

38.5 (11.0)

33.6 (15.4)

36.7 (12.9)

2.0 – 59.8

Simulator Prediction

50.2 (6.7)

54.2 (8.4)

51.7 (7.6)

37.5 – 67.5

Simulator Postdiction

46.7 (5.4)

50.1 (7.7)

48.0 (6.5)

40.0 – 62.5

Simulator Prediction Accuracy

11.7 (11.0)

21.3 (17.3)

15.3 (14.3)

-8.2 – 64.7

Simulator Postdiction Accuracy

7.5 (10.2)

18.4 (13.9)

11.5 (12.8)

-12.0 – 49.7

Awareness Questionnaire (AQ):
Self-report:

SO-report on survivor:

Simulator:

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons of Survivors with Intact (n = 34) and Impaired (n = 20) Awareness of Abilities.

Group
Intact Awareness
(n = 34)
Variable

Impaired Awareness
(n = 20)

F(1,52)
or X2(1)

p

SD

M

SD

Age (years)

55.3

9.0

56.1

11.0

0.09

.77

Education (years)

13.9

2.6

14.5

1.9

0.87

.36

Percent Male

52.9

60.0

0.25

.61

Percent Right Handed

100.0

90.0
0.55

.76

0.00

.97

0.72

.40

Laterality
Left

50.0

55.0

Right

35.3

30.0

Bilateral/other

14.7

15.0

Time since stroke (months)

44.5

Percent driving

64.7

72.7

43.8
55.0

81.7
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Table 5. Demographic Statistics for Stroke Survivors’ Significant Others (N = 54).
Variable

M

SD

Range

Age (years)

46.6

(14.1)

18 - 72

Education (years)

13.9

(2.3)

10 – 20

Percent Men

29.6

Percent Right Handed

92.6

Significant Others

Kinship (%)
Spouse/Romantic Partner

49.1

Adult Child

21.3

Parent

3.7

Other Family

15.7

Friend

8.3

Percent driving

100

Table 6. Correlations: Driving Simulator Performance, Ratings of Abilities, and Awareness of Deficit for Stroke Survivors (N = 54).

Simulator
Actual
Performance

Postdicted

Accuracy of
Predicted
Performance

Accuracy of
Postdicted
Performance

Simulator

Simulator

Predicted

.21†

--

--

--

--

Simulator Postdicted

.33**

.45**

--

--

--

Awareness of deficit: AQ Difference Total

-.31*

.22†

.22†

.42**

.49**

AQ Difference - Cognitive

-.33**

.17

.17

.41**

.48**

AQ Difference - Behavioral/Affective

-.18†

.25*

.28*

.31**

.37**

AQ Difference - Motor/Sensory

-.40**

.20†

.14

.49**

.53**

Note. AQ = Awareness Questionnaire, Total score, and Cognitive, Behavioral/Affective, and Motor/Sensory domains; AQ Difference
= (Survivor self-report) – (SO-report on survivor). Accuracy of predicted performance = (Predicted performance – Actual simulator
performance); Accuracy of postdicted performance = (Postdicted performance – Actual simulator performance). † p < .10, *p < .05,
**p < .01.
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Table 7: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Performance on the Driving
Simulator.

Variable

R2

Beta

sr2

F

df

p

R2
Change

Model 1

.10

Sig F
Change

2.54

2,47

.09

--

---

4.41

5,47

.003

.24

.004

-.24
Age
.22
Stroke Severity

Model 2

.34
-.23

.07

.18

.04

-.24

.02

.44

.10

-.52

.12

Age

Stroke Severity

AQ Cog Diff

AQ Beh Diff
AQ Mot Diff
2

Note. sr (unique) = squared semipartial correlation; AQ Cog Diff = AQ Patient Cognitive Subscale –
Significant Other Cognitive Subscale; AQ Beh Diff = AQ Patient Behavioral/Affective Subscale –
Significant Other Behavioral/Affective Subscale; AQ Mot Diff = AQ Patient Motor Subscale – Significant
†
Other Motor Subscale. p <.10, *p < .05. **p < .01.

Table 8. Correlations: Driving Simulator Performance and Ratings of Abilities for Stroke Survivors with Intact (n = 34) and Impaired (n
= 20) Awareness of Deficit.
Simulator Actual
Performance

Simulator
Predicted

Simulator
Postdicted

Accuracy Predicted Accuracy Postdicted
Performance
Performance

Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired

Simulator Predicted

.21†

Simulator Postdicted

.32*

.21

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

.33** .29†

.53*

.45**

.42*

.41*

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

-.22† -.15

-.14

.24*

.27†

.03

.16

.11

-.01

.33**

.31*

.13

.34**

.24†

.11

Cognitive

-.24*

-.07

-.25

.14

.17

-.09

.10

-.02

-.03

.30*

.17

.17

.33**

.08

.20

Behavioral/Affective

-.07

-.13

.14

.30*

.19

.21

.19†

.19

-.01

.22†

.25†

-.04

.21†

.23†

-.14

Motor/Sensory

-.29*

-.17

-.28

.23*

.34

-.01

.18

.14

.03

.40**

.38*

.24

.43**

.32*

.28

Total score

.19

.15

.09

-.04

.28†

-.08

-.13

.10

-.10

-.23*

-.02

-.16

-.30*

-.05

-.15

Cognitive

.17

.10

.07

-.08

.12

.00

-.12

-.03

.05

-.22† -.03

-.10

-.28*

-.08

-.09

Behavioral/Affective

.16

.06

.14

-.01

.27†

-.09

-.18† .07

-.24

-.18† .10

-.20

-.27*

.04

-.27

Motor/Sensory

.21†

.32*

-.02

.03

.42**

-.19

-.20† .37*

-.06

-.20† -.17

-.11

-.21† -.14

Self-rated abilities (AQ)
Total score

.04

Note. SO-rated = significant-other ratings of the survivor’s abilities; AQ = Awareness Questionnaire. Accuracy of predicted performance = (Predicted – Actual
†
simulator); Accuracy of postdicted performance = (Postdicted – Actual simulator) performance. p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics and Comparison for Awareness Groups (Intact n = 34, Impaired n
= 17).
Group
Intact
(n = 34)
Cognitive Estimation

Impaired
(n = 17)

M

SD

M

SD

t (49)

d

Z - Scoring
BCET Total
BCET Quantity
BCET Weight
BCET Distance
BCET Time

0.15
0.01
0.44
-0.04
0.18

0.57
0.87
1.12
0.92
0.90

0.04
0.32
0.47
-0.34
-0.28

0.70
1.62
1.22
0.72
0.74

0.60
-0.88
-0.11
1.14
1.83

.18
.26
.03
.33
.53

Traditional Scoring
BCET Total
BCET Quantity
BCET Weight
BCET Distance
BCET Time

18.22
4.65
4.70
4.45
4.44

1.52
0.65
0.64
1.06
0.79

17.72
4.08
4.69
4.55
4.29

1.89
0.93
0.70
0.83
0.92

1.02
2.60**
0.04
-0.31
0.60

.30
.75
.01
.09
.17

Note: BCET = Biber Cognitive Estimation Test. Z-scoring = directional scoring. d = Cohen’s d.
†
p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.

Table 10. Correlations: Driving Simulator Performance and Ratings of Abilities for Stroke Survivors with Intact (n = 34) and Impaired
(n = 17) Awareness of Deficit.
Simulator Actual
Performance

Simulator
Predicted

Simulator
Postdicted

Accuracy Predicted Accuracy Postdicted
Performance
Performance

Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired

Cognitive Estimation
.10

.06

.10

.46**

.41**

.56**

.08

.02

.21

.12

.19

.11

-.09

-.08

-.05

BCET Time

.08

-.11

.27

.23†

.17

.51*

.19†

.19

.40†

.03

.22

-.03

-.08

.11

-.12

BCET Distance

.12

.25†

-.17

.34**

.23†

.72**

-.02

-.09

.24

.06

.12

.51*

-.10

-.30*

.43*

BCET Quantity

.17

.24†

.16

.34**

.24†

.43*

-.03

-.19

.06

-.01

-10

.00

-.22† -.39*

-.24

BCET Weight

-.11

-.18

-.03

.22†

.34*

.03

.08

.12

.02

.21†

.40*

.01

.18

.32*

.02

.23*

.26†

.16

.05

-.01

.19

.16

.27†

.11

-.20† -.27† -.06

-.19

-.25† .00

BCET Time

-.02

-.03

.09

.18†

.03

.60**

-.05

-.01

.01

.13

.05

.20

.01

-.03

.01

BCET Distance

.18†

.29

-.13

-.01

.09

-.35† .13

.23

-.16

-.16

-.24

-.04

-.12

-.25

.12

BCET Quantity

.10

-.16

.16

-.11

.00

-.16

.10

.22

.07

-.17

.16

-.17

-.09

.26†

.01

BCET Weight

.28*

.31*

.36†

-.10

-.21

.02

.25*

.04

.55*

-.39** -.46** -.39† -.25*

-.38*

-.19

BCET Total Correct

Note. BCET = Biber Cognitive Estimation Test. BCET Z = Directional scoring. BCET Correct – Traditional scoring. Accuracy of predicted performance =
†
(Predicted – Actual simulator); Accuracy of postdicted performance = (Postdicted – Actual simulator) performance. p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Table 11. Correlations of Cognitive Estimation and Ratings of Abilities for Stroke Survivors (N = 54) with Intact (n = 34) and Impaired
(n = 20) Awareness of Deficit.

Self-rated Total

Self-rated Cognitive

Self-rated
Behavioral/Affective

Self-rated
Motor/Sensory

Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired Total Intact Impaired

Cognitive Estimation
.11

.41**

.03

.05

.34*

-.06

.18†

.28†

.22

.09

.37*

-.03

BCET Time

-.05

.31*

-.09

-.15

.09

-.18

.12

.46**

.10

-.09

.20

-.16

BCET Distance

-.00

.34*

-.15

.07

.48**

-.16

-.04

.16

-.14

-.07

.08

-.11

BCET Quantity

.16

.09

.12

.10

.21

-.03

.25*

-.09

.40†

.06

.09

-.04

BCET Weight

.13

.22

.09

.07

.06

.09

.08

.13

-.03

.26*

.45**

.15

-.46** -.35* -.58** -.46** -.41** -.51* -.35**

-.19

-.46* -.45**

-.19

-.66**

BCET Time

-.29*

-.10

-.51* -.36**

-.22

-.54*

-.18†

-.08

-.31

-.20†

.15

-.56*

BCET Distance

-.14

-.33*

-.06

-.31*

.04

-.13

-.31*

-.08

-.15

-.15

-.24

BCET Quantity

-.44**

-.00

-.10

-.50

-.38**

.06

.07

-.50*

-.15

-.19

-.10

-.15

-.10

-.02

BCET Total Correct

BCET Weight

-.11

-.56** -.43**
-.18

-.10

-.55** -.39**
-.16

-.24* -.43**

-.18
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Fifty-four stroke survivors completed a driving evaluation. Measures included
predicted, postdicted, and actual performance on a driving simulator evaluation and a
modified Biber Cognitive Estimation Test. Survivors nominated a significant other to
serve as a knowledgeable informant about their abilities. Awareness of deficit was
assessed

via

survivor-significant

other

difference

scores

on

the

Awareness

Questionnaire. Five predictors (age, stroke severity, and awareness of cognitive,
behavioral/affective, and motor abilities) reliably distinguished between survivors who
passed and failed the driving simulator evaluation and predicted 34% of the variance in
simulator prediction.

Unawareness of cognitive and motor/sensory skills showed a

stronger inverse relationship to driving performance than did awareness of the
emotional/behavioral domain.

Awareness of deficit moderated the accuracy of

survivors’ self-evaluations of their simulator performance (predicted and actual): Among
survivors aware of their deficits, simulator prediction and postdiction scores were
modestly related to actual simulator performance; among survivors unaware of their
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deficits, only postdiction correlated with simulator performance. Level of awareness did
not affect correlations between self-ratings of cognitive, behavioral/affective and
motor/sensory abilities and actual simulator performance, predicted simulator
performance,

or

postdicted

simulator

performance.

Survivor

self-ratings

of

behavioral/affective abilities were unrelated to driving simulator performance whereas
self-ratings of motor/sensory and cognitive abilities were negatively correlated with
driving ability.

General cognitive estimation skills were positively correlated with

prediction of performance on the simulator in both the aware and unaware survivor
groups, with stronger prediction for the unaware participants. However, cognitive
estimation scores were not related to the accuracy of self evaluations of driving skills on
the simulator. Thus, stroke survivors who overestimated their cognitive and
motor/sensory abilities made less accurate estimates of their driving ability and
performed worse in a driving simulator than did survivors who were aware of their
deficits; however, the accuracy of their self-ratings improved significantly after the
simulator evaluation. This work supports research showing that awareness moderates
driving ability and that awareness is multidimensional.

Furthermore, the driving

simulator may be a useful tool in raising survivors’ awareness of their deficits as it
relates to driving ability.
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